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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper traces the growing acceptance of the more economic approach to 
IPR and competition law in state practices, and summarizes its characteristics. It 
then compares how five jurisdictions weigh the IPR licensing agreements against 
competition law in the context of patent pools, which have become critically effective 
mechanism for both patent enforcement and the deployment of new technology. It 
further analyzes the major difference found, namely the abuse of a dominant 
position by patent pools, and how to look at this difference and even how to 
harmonize it. It then moves on to study the impact of antitrust violation by patent 
pools on the cease-and-decease request based on IPR and on the licensing 
agreements. The concluding section brings forward three points worthy of further 
attention: the transparency of patent pools toward competition authorities, the need 
of maintaining comprehensive guidelines on IPR licensing agreements, and the 
effects that the more economic approach should pursue. 
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The traditional and normative view on the relationship between 
intellectual property rights (hereinafter IPR) and competition law1 was that 
IPR was an ‘exception’ to competition law which applied only where IPR 
was used to constrain competition outside the scope of the exclusive right.2 
However, the dominant theory has evolved and now perceives a 
complementary relationship between IPR and competition law, with both 
sharing the common goal of promoting innovation and enhancing consumer 
welfare while balancing the interests of IPR holders on the one hand and the 
public interest,3 competition in particular, on the other. 
Nonetheless, different jurisdictions interpret and apply this 
complementary relationship differently when assessing the legality of 
various IPR licensing agreements. These differences can undermine 
cross-border IPR enforcement, the certainty and legitimacy of the IPR, and 
have ramifications on the development and use of new technologies. To 
bridge these differences, a more economic approach has been advocated, 
which takes into consideration the competitive effects of licensing 
agreements and supplements the ultimate legal judgment with objective 
measurement and evaluation, without however ignoring other values and 
normative concerns.  
This paper endeavors to trace and confirm the growing acceptance of 
the more economic approach to IPR and competition law in state practices, 
and to pinpoint its characteristics. It then proceeds to compare how five 
jurisdictions (USA, EU, Japan, Korea and Taiwan) weigh the IPR licensing 
agreements against competition law in the context of patent pools, which 
                                                                                                                            
 1. More than 100 countries around the world have adopted competition law in one way or 
another. See Christopher Bellamy, Foreword to BELLAMY & CHILD: EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW OF 
COMPETITION, at ix (Peter Roth & Vivien Rose eds., 6th ed. 2008). 
 2. See SHITEKI-DOKUSEN NO KINSHI OYOBI KŌSEITORHIKI NO KAKUHO NI KANSURU HŌRITSU 
[DOKUKINHŌ] [ACT ON PROHIBITION OF PRIVATE MONOPOLIZATION AND MAINT. OF FAIR TRADE] 
1947, art. 21 (Japan) (“The provisions of this Act shall not apply to such acts recognizable as the 
exercise of rights under the Copyright Act, Patent Act, Utility Model Act, Design Act or Trademark 
Act.”); Fair Trade Act, art. 45 (1991) (amended 2011) (Taiwan), available at  
http://law.moj.gov.tw/Eng/LawClass/LawSearchNo.aspx?PC=J0150002&DF=&SNo=45; Dokjeom 
gyuje mit gongjeong geooraeae gwanhan beobyul [Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act], Act No. 
6651, Jan. 26, 2002, art. 59 (S. Kor.); Fanlungtuan Fa [Anti-monopolization Law] (promulgated by the 
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 30, 2007, effective Aug. 1, 2008), art. 55 (China) (going a 
step further in prohibiting the abuse of IPR that eliminates or restricts competition, and “[t]his Law 
does not govern the conduct of business operators to exercise their intellectual property rights under 
laws and relevant administrative regulations on intellectual property rights; however, business 
operators’ conduct to eliminate or restrict market competition by abusing their intellectual property 
rights shall be governed by this Law.”). 
 3. Josef Drexl et al., Comments on the Draft Technology Transfer Block Exemption Regulation, 
35 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 187, 187-88 (2004); Josef Drexl, Is there a ‘more 
economic approach’ to intellectual property and competition law?, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND COMPETITION LAW 27, 35 (Josef Drexl ed., 2008). 
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have become critically effective mechanism for both patent enforcement and 
the deployment of new technology. This paper further analyzes the major 
difference found, namely the abuse of a dominant position by patent pools 
and how to look upon and even harmonize it. It then moves on to study the 
impact of antitrust violation by patent pools on the cease-and-decease 
request based on IPR and on the licensing agreements. The concluding 
section brings forward three points worthy of further attention: the 
transparency of patent pools toward competition authorities, the need of 
maintaining comprehensive guidelines on IPR licensing agreements, and the 
effects that the more economic approach should pursue.  
 
II. THE ADOPTION OF THE MORE ECONOMIC APPROACH 
 
To approach IPR from a more economic approach represents a sensible 
departure from the old-school “form(norm)-based” legalist dogma that failed 
to explain the rationale behind the IPR regime establishment and its shifting 
dynamics. An economic approach can help clarify IPR as absolute or natural 
rights and place it more reasonably in the ecology of numerous exchanges 
and mutual enrichment between the public and private sectors. Economically 
speaking, IPR is there to remedy market failure due to the nature of ipublic 
goods nature and not to engender market failure. In other words, IPR is not 
meant to cause monopoly power as such, nor does it guarantee profit for or 
recoupment of investment. 4  Competition-oriented legislation and 
interpretation of IPR is conducive to the promotion of competition in general 
and also an effective tool to put IPR in the evenhanded role of balancing 
competing interests.5  As will be explained in the following, the more 




The wholesale economic approach to IPR originates from the 
                                                                                                                            
 4. See Drexl et al., supra note 3, at 45-46, 50-51. 
 5. Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement art. 27, ¶ 3, Oct. 1, 2011, USTR-2010-0014 [hereinafter 
ACTA] (“Each Party shall endeavor to promote cooperative efforts within the business community to 
effectively address trademark and copyright or related rights infringement while preserving legitimate 
competition . . . . ”), available at  
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/i_property/pdfs/acta1105_en.pdf. ACTA is probably the first 
international treaty to mention “preserving competition” in the context of IPR. Of course, whether this 
is just a lip service, remains to be seen. For related discussion, see ROBERTO D’ERME ET AL., OPINION 
OF EUROPEAN ACADEMICS ON ANTI-COUNTERFEITING TRADE AGREEMENT (2011), available at 
http://www.statewatch.org/news/2011/jul/acta-academics-opinion.pdf; EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 
COMMENTS ON THE “OPINION OF EUROPEAN ACADEMICS ON ANTI-COUNTERFEITING TRADE 
AGREEMENT” (Apr. 27, 2011 ), available at 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2011/april/tradoc_147853.pdf. 
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Department of Justice (hereinafter ‘DOJ’) of the United States when it 
appointed the UC Berkeley economics professor Richard Gilbert as its 
Deputy Assistant Attorney General for Economics in 1993, who was the 
driving force behind the famous “Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of 
Intellectual Property” (hereinafter ‘U.S. Guidelines’) in 1995 by the DOJ 
and the Federal Trade Commission (hereinafter ‘FTC’). The Guidelines 
continue and amplify the trend set by the 1986 watershed case of 
Windsurfing International, Inc. v. AMF, Inc., in which the alleged infringer 
in resorting to patent misuse was required to ‘show that the patentee has 
impermissibly broadened the “physical or temporal scope” of the patent 
grant with anticompetitive effect, marking a clear deviation from the 1960s 
and 1970s when courts adopted per se rule of patent misuse and routinely 
refused to enforce patents where extension of the monopoly-type abuse was 
demonstrated, without requiring evidence of anticompetitive effect. 
More than a decade later, the DOJ and the FTC issued in April 2007 the 
“Antitrust Enforcement and Intellectual Property Rights: Promoting 
Innovation and Competition” Report (hereinafter ‘AE & IPR Report’) which 
maintains that the U.S. Guidelines are an integral part of their analysis of 
IPR and antitrust issues.6 The AE & IPR Report analyzes in great length the 
antitrust considerations for many licensing agreements, including patent 





The economic approach to IPR was uttered in Europe when the 
esteemed German Max Planck Institute for Foreign and International Patent, 
Copyright and Competition Law appointed new directors and changed its 
name that includes “Intellectual Property and Competition Law” (hereinafter 
‘Max Planck Institute’) in 2002. The overall research profile of the Max 
Planck Institute as posted on its website states clearly “intellectual property 
should correctly be understood within the context of competition law”. The 
Max Planck Institute’s approach influences or inspires many European 
scholars.7 A latest manifestation of such inspiration is seen in the Proposals 
                                                                                                                            
 6. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AND 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: PROMOTING INNOVATION AND COMPETITION (2007) [hereinafter 
AE & IPR REP.], available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/hearings/ip/222655.pdf. Prior to the 
AE & IPR Report, the FTC issued a report entitled “To promote Innovation: The Proper Balance of 
Competition and Patent Law and Policy,” to present its conclusions about and recommendation for the 
improvement of patent system to work with competition in the proper balance. See FED. TRADE 
COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND 
POLICY (2003), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf. 
 7. See, e.g., Christophe Geiger et al., Declaration on a Balanced Interpretation of the “Three-Step 
Test” in Copyright Law, 1 J. INTELL. PROPERTY, INFO. TECH. & ELEC. COM. L. 119 (July, 2010), 
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for Amendment of TRIPS by several European universities in cooperation 
with the Max Planck Institute which proposed a new Article 8b into the 
TRIPS Agreement to specifically address the interface between IPR and 
competition law.8 
Beginning from the 1999 Umbrella Regulation on vertical agreements, 
the European Commission started to depart from the previous legalistic 
approach and introduced the new market-share approach.9 The European 
Commission takes up an “economic-based approach” to IPR most notably in 
its Regulation (EC) No. 772/2004 of 27 April 2004 on the application of 
Article 81(3) of the Treaty to categories of technology transfer agreements 
(Technology Transfer Block Exemption Regulation, hereinafter ‘EU 
TTBER’), 10  which replaces the 1996 Block Exemption Regulation on 
Technology Transfer Agreements. On the same day, the Commission issued 
the “Guidelines on the application of Article. 81 of the EC Treaty to 
technology transfer agreements” (hereinafter ‘EU Guidelines’) in order to 
provide guidance on the application of the EU TTBER as well as on the 
application of Article 81 to technology transfer agreements that fall outside 
the scope of the EU TTBER.11 
                                                                                                                            
http://www.jipitec.eu/issues/jipitec-1-2-2010/2621/Declaration-Balanced-Interpretation-Of-The-Three
-Step-Test.pdf.  
 8. The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 
U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS], available at  
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/t_agm0_e.htm. The proposed new Article 8(b) titled  
“Interface Between Intellectual Property Rights and Competition Law” stipulates: 
1. For the purposes of maintaining a fair balance between intellectual property rights and 
free competition: (a) Members shall provide for legislative or administrative measures, in 
particular, in the form of limitations of the rights or in the form of compulsory licenses, if the 
use of the product protected by an intellectual property right is indispensable for competition 
in the relevant market, unless the application of such measures would have a significantly 
negative effect on the incentives to invest in research and development; (b) Members should 
further provide for remedies if the use of an intellectual property right results in the abuse of 
a dominant position on the relevant market or in behaviour violating anti-trust principles. 2. 
To the extent that compliance with para. 1 depends on the establishment of an efficient 
system for control of competition, Art. 8.3 shall apply mutatis mutandis. 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN A FAIR WORLD TRADE SYSTEM: PROPOSALS FOR REFORM OF 
TRIPS 455 (Annette Kur & Marianne Levin eds., 2011). 
 9. Drexl et al., supra note 3, at 29. 
 10. Commission Regulation No. 772/2004, On the Application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty to 
Categories of Technology Transfer Agreements, 2004 O.J. (L 123) 11 [hereinafter EU TTBER], 
available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32004R0772:EN:HTML. 
All references to Articles 81 and 82 EC should be understood as references to the current Articles 101 
and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (hereinafter TFEU) as renamed by 
the Treaty of Lisbon, which entered into force on 1 December 2009. Article 101(1) prohibits cartel 
activities, (2) declares such activities automatically void, and (3) provides exceptions under certain 
conditions. Article 102 outlaws the abuse of dominant market position. 
 11. Guidelines on the Application of Article 81 of the EC Treaty to Technology Transfer 
Agreements, 2004 O.J. (C 101) 2 [hereinafter Guidelines on the Application of Art. 81], available at  
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2004:101:0002:0042:EN:PDF. The EU 
TTBER has a rather limited scope of application. First, the Council Regulation 19/66 did not empower 
the Commission to block exempt technology transfer agreements concluded between more than two 




Article 21 of the Japanese Antimonopoly Act precludes the provisions of 
this Act from applying to acts recognizable as the exercise of rights under 
IPR law. The Japan Fair Trade Commission published the Guidelines for 
Patent and Know-how Licensing Agreements under the Antimonopoly Act 
on 30 July 1999. This was replaced by the Guidelines for the Use of 
Intellectual Property under the Antimonopoly Act (Japanese Guidelines) 
issued on 28 September 2007.13 The Guidelines are applicable to those 
intellectual property rights that are concerned with technology. They are 
meant to comprehensively specify the principles by which the Antimonopoly 
Act is applied to restrictions pertaining to the use of technology.14 In the 
Japanese Guidelines, the categorical classification has been diminished and a 




Article 59 of the Korean Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act states 
that the provisions of this Act shall not apply to any act deemed to be an 
exercise of rights under the Copyright Act, Patent Act, Utility Models Act, 
Design Act, or Trademark Act. The Korean Fair Trade Commission 
(hereinafter ‘KFTC’) issued Review Guidelines on Undue Exercise of 
Intellectual Property Rights in 2000 (last amendment on 31 March 2010, 
                                                                                                                            
undertakings. Consequently the EU TTBER only deals with technology transfer agreements between a 
licensor and a licensee (Recital 19). Second, the EU TTBER does not cover all IPR and is limited to 
licensing agreements that involve patent (including patent applications, utility models, applications for 
registration of utility models, designs, topographies of semiconductor products, supplementary 
protection certificates for medicinal products or other products for which such supplementary 
protection certificates may be obtained and plant breeder’s certificates) know-how, software copyright 
or the mix thereof (Article 1). Third, the EU TTBER excludes licensing agreements that set up 
technology pools (pooling of technologies with the purpose of licensing the created package of IPR to 
third parties) (Recital 7). However, to those technology transfer agreements concluded between more 
than two undertakings, including patent pools, which are of the same nature as those covered by the 
EU TTBER, the Commission will apply by analogy the principles set out in the EU TTBER 
(Guidelines on the Application of Art. 81 ¶ 40). EU TTBER, supra note 10, Recitals 7, 19, art. 1; 
Guidelines on the Application of Art. 81, ¶ 40. 
 12. For a comprehensive description of the development of the interface between IPR and 
competition law in Japan before 2005, see Christopher Heath, The Interface Between Competition Law 
and Intellectual Property in Japan, in THE INTERFACE BETWEEN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 
AND COMPETITION POLICY 250, 250-311 (Steven D. Anderman ed., 2007). 
 13. JAPAN FAIR TRADE COMM’N, GUIDELINES FOR THE USE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
UNDER THE ANTIMONOPOLY ACT (2007) [hereinafter GU], available at  
http://www.jftc.go.jp/en/legislation_guidelines/ama/pdf/070928_IP_Guideline.pdf.  
 14. Id. pt. 1(2). 
 15. Junko Shibata, Patent and Know-how Licenses Under the Japanese Antimonopoly Act, in 
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND COMPETITION LAW 201, 211 (Joseph 
Drexl ed., 2008). 
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hereinafter ‘Korean Guidelines’).16 The Korean Guidelines also follow an 
economic approach. It is stated as one of its basic principles that,  
 
[I]n the event that the exercise of intellectual property rights 
produces the effects of impeding fair trade and improving 
efficiency at the same time, such exercise shall, in principle, be 
reviewed by comparing its positive and negative effects to 
determine whether or not the exercise is contrary to the Act. If the 
effect of improving efficiency outweighs the effect of impeding fair 
trade, it may be determined that the said exercise is not a breach of 
the Act.17 
 
E. Taiwan  
 
The Taiwanese FTA18 prohibits the abuse of dominant market position 
(Article 10) and the forming of cartels (Article 14). In addition, the FTA also 
prohibits certain activities that are likely to restrain competition or to impede 
fair competition in relevant markets (Article. 19). With regard to the 
relationship between IPR and competition law, Article 45 of the FTA reads: 
“No provision of this law shall apply to any proper conduct in connection 
with the exercise of rights pursuant to the provisions of the Copyright Law, 
Trademark Law, or Patent Law.” 
The Taiwan Fair Trade Commission (hereinafter ‘TFTC’) promulgated 
Guidelines on Technology Licensing Agreements (hereinafter ‘Taiwanese 
Guidelines’) on 20 January 2001,19 to explain how it would treat patents 
and/or know-how licensing agreements according to the FTA as a whole.20 
The Taiwanese Guidelines were revised in 2005 and 2007 exclusively for 
formatting reasons. In February 2009 the Taiwanese Guidelines were in part 
substantially amended, deleting the so-called gray clauses, leaving white 
clauses unchanged and expanding the coverage of the examples of 
prohibited clauses while completely relaxing the previous rigid stance of 
illegal per se. This was a move that implicitly followed the European 
Commission and the more economic approach. Its review and analysis 
                                                                                                                            
 16. Review Guidelines on Undue Exercise of Intellectual Property Rights (2000) (amended 2010) 
(S. Kor.), available at 
http://eng.ftc.go.kr/files/static/Legal_Authority/Review%20Guidelines%20on%20Undue%20Exercise
%20of%20Intellectual%20Property%20Rights.pdf.  
 17. Id. II(2)(C). 
 18. Fair Trade Act (1991) (amended 2011) (Taiwan), available at  
http://law.moj.gov.tw/Eng/LawClass/LawContent.aspx?PCODE=J0150002. 
 19 .  Fair Trade Commission Disposal Direction (Guidelines) on Technology Licensing 
Arrangements (2001) (amended 2009) (Taiwan), available at  
http://www.ftc.gov.tw/internet/english/doc/docDetail.aspx?uid=746&docid=10254. 
 20. See id. point 2.  
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emphasize on possible or actual restraint of competition or unfair 
competition created by such arrangements in the relevant goods, technology 
and innovation markets.21 
 
III. THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE MORE ECONOMIC APPROACH 
 
There are at least three major features of the more economic approach to 
IPR and its licensing agreements, namely recognition of the economics of 
IPR, the intervention threshold and rule of reason. 
 
A. Recognition of the Economics of IPR 
 
The economics of IPR lies in its fundamental function of enhancing 
innovation and the development of new products and services (hereinafter 
‘dynamic competition’), and in its inherent characteristics such as the ease of 
misappropriation, high fixed costs exacerbated by low/zero marginal costs, 
uncertainty of right’s boundary (claim interpretation in patent law, the 
likelihood of confusion and dilution in trademark law, the case-dependence 
of fair-use defense in the copyright law), and the value of IPR depends on 
combination of other factors of production.22 If access to IPR is denied, the 
level of innovation would in principle be adversely impacted, as opposed to 
the denial of access to tangible property.23 
The economics of IPR could legitimately take on different facets and 
paradigms in the highly connected global economy, especially when 
essential IPR that involves network effects, compatibility (not in the least 
backward compatibility), de jure or de facto standards, and 
popularity-induced indispensableness (e.g. pachinko machines in Japan) is at 
stake and possessed by dominant market players. As internal regulatory 
failures of IPR may exclude dynamic competition,24 it is incumbent on IPR 
specialists to reform the IPR regime from within by following the more 
economic approach. In the patent field, it would be desirable to recognize 
that the maintenance of competition is a public policy objective worthy of 
protection via compulsory patent licensing. 25  Just as Reto Hilty 
convincingly argues that there are inherent competition policy considerations 
                                                                                                                            
 21. See id. points 4(C)(ii) & 4(C)(vi). 
 22. AE & IPR REP., supra note 6, at 4. 
 23. Drexl et al., supra note 3, at 49-50; Reto Hilty, Patent Enforcement, in THE ENFORCEMENT 
OF PATENTS 11 (Kung-Chung Liu & Reto Hilty eds., Max Planck Series on Asian Intell. Prop. Set, 
2011). 
 24. Drexl et al., supra note 3, at 53. 
 25. Kung-Chung Liu, Rationalizing the Regime of Compulsory Patent Licensing by the Essential 
Facilities Doctrine, 39 INT’L. REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 757, 773 (2008); Rupprecht 
Podszun, Lizenzverweigerung—Ernstfall im Verhältnis von Kartell- und Immaterialgüterrecht, in 
JAHRBUCH KARTELL- UND WETTBEWERBSRECHT 57, 74 (Peter Matousek et al. eds., 2010). 
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in the compulsory licensing regimes both in the Berne and Paris Convention, 
compulsory patent licensing according to patent law (e.g. Article 24(1)(2) of 
the German Patent Act) also allows the intervention of compulsory licensing 
to eliminate problematic situations from the viewpoint of competition 
policy.26 
In order to pursue the realization of such a goal, countries need to free 
themselves from the seemingly binding TRIPS Agreement. Commendably, 
the German Supreme Court took a liberal stance in interpreting the TRIPS 
Agreement in the “Orange-Book-Standard” case (May 6, 2009) decision.27 
It started from the assumption that Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement in 
principle grants the right to use the patent without authorization from the 
patentee, so long as the permission is based on the circumstances of 
individual cases. In addition, condition of Article 31(b) (on reasonable 
commercial terms and conditions) is satisfied if the patent infringer prior to 
the commencement of use has tried fruitlessly to acquire a license on 
non-discriminating terms (Paragraph 28 of the decision).28 
 
B. Intervention Threshold 
 
IPR agreements would only harm competition if there was sufficient 
market power. Thus it is a popular practice among countries to set up 
intervention threshold (safety zone or harbor) that would exclude IPR 
agreements of minor market significance from scrutiny. Under the U.S. 
Guidelines (section 4.3), except under extraordinary circumstances, the DOJ 
and the FTC will not challenge a restraint in an IPR licensing arrangement if 
(1) the restraint is not prima facie anticompetitive29 and (2) the licensor and 
                                                                                                                            
 26 .  Reto Hilty, Renaissance der Zwangzlizezen im Urheberrecht? Gedanken zu 
Ungereimtheiten auf der urheberrechtlichen Wertschöpfungskette, 111 GEWERBLICHER 
RECHTSSCHUTZ UND URHEBERRECHT [GRUR] 633, 641-42 (2009) (Ger.). Richard Li-Dar Wang 
argues for a compulsory license system that charges reach-through royalties, which are measured by 
the contribution that patented research inputs make to the individual research. See Richard Li-Dar 
Wang, Biomedical Upstream Patenting and Scientific Research: The Case for Compulsory Licenses 
Bearing Reach—through Royalties, 10 YALE J.L. & TECH. 251, 251 (2008).  
 27 Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] May 6, 2009, NEUE JURISTISCHE 
WOCHENSCHRIFT RECHTSPRECHUNG-REPORT ZIVILRECHT [NJW-RR] 1047, 2009 (Ger.). 
 28. Kuei-Jung Ni also argues for the freedom of Members to decide on the grounds for 
compulsory licensing, especially from the perspective of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties. See Kuei-Jung Ni, WTO Huiyuan Sheting Chiangchih Shouchuan Shihyu te Chuanhsien: Yi 
Weiyehna Tiaoyuehfa Kungyueh chih Chiehshih Yuantse Fenhsi Feilipu CD-R Chuanli Tehsu Shihshih 
Shihyu yu TRIPS te Hsiangkuanhsing [The Competence of a WTO Member in Determining the 
Grounds for Compulsory Licensing: The Compatibility of the Ground for Triggering Compulsory 
Licensing on Philips’ CD-R Patents with the TRIPS Agreement in Light of the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties], KUOLI TAIWAN TAHSUEH FAHSUEH LUNTSUNG [NTU L. J.], Sept. 2010, at 369,  
415-16.  
 29. According to footnote 30 of the U.S. Guidelines, “facially anticompetitive” refers to restraints 
that normally warrant per se treatment, as well as other restraints of a kind that would always or almost 
always tend to reduce output or increase prices. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, 
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its licensees collectively account for no more than 20% of each relevant 
market significantly affected by the restraint. The EU block exempts 
technology agreements by parties whose combined market share does not 
exceed 20% on the affected relevant technology and product market when 
they are competing undertakings. Where the undertakings parties to the 
agreements are not competing undertakings and the market share of each of 
the parties does not exceed 30% on the affected relevant technology and 
product market, the block exemption will also apply (Article 3 EU TTBER).  
The Japanese Guidelines adopt a 20% threshold of sorts. 30  The 
Guidelines list cases where restrictions may have major impacts on 
competition (acts between competitors and when influential technologies are 
involved) and cases where restrictions are deemed to have minor effect in 
reducing competition. In principle, restrictions pertaining to the use of 
technology are deemed to have a minor effect in reducing competition when 
the entrepreneurs using the technology subject to the restrictions in the 
business activity have a share in the product market of 20% or less in total. 
This is not applicable however to the conduct of restricting sale prices, sales 
quantity, market share, sales territories or customers for the product 
incorporating the technology or to the conduct of restricting research and 
development activities or obliging entrepreneurs to assign rights or grant 
exclusive licenses for improved technology.31 The impact of a particular 
restriction on competition in the technology market is also deemed to have a 
minor effect in reducing competition if the product share is in principle 20% 
or less in total.32 
 
C. Rule of Reason over Per Se Rule 
 
There are two types of per se rule: per se illegal and per se legal. Per se 
rule has its appeal and drawbacks. It can provide better legal certainty, but at 
the same time its rigidity is a mismatch for market and commercial realities. 
So following the more economic approach, the rule of reason gradually 
triumphs over the per se rule. 
                                                                                                                            
ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 22 n.30 (1995),  
available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0558.pdf. 
 30. See Ting-Tong Yen, Jihpen Tuchan Chinchihfa Tuiyu Chishu Shouchuan Hsingwei chih 
Kueifan—Chienlun tui Wokuo Kungpingfa Kueifan chih Chishih [The Rules of Technology Licensing 
Agreements Under Japanese Antimonopoly Law—Reflections on Taiwan’s Fair Trade Act], KUNGPING 
CHIAOYI CHIKAN [FAIR TRADE Q.], July 2009, at 99, 108; Masako Wakui, Standardisation and Patent 
Pools in Japan, in VALUING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN JAPAN, BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES 
81, 99 (Ruth Taplin ed., 2004). 
 31. One referee inquires why the 20% threshold does not apply to such conducts. The Japanese 
Guidelines do not provide further explanation. Presumably it is because such conducts are in 
themselves cartels which are strictly prohibited. GU, supra note 13.  
 32. Id. pt. 2(5). 
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1. Per Se Illegal Rule Phasing Out 
 
With regards to the per se illegal rule, the U.S. DOJ had in the 1970s 
demonstrated a general hostility toward patent licensing and ultimately 
promulgated a list of “Nine No-Nos” that were presumed per se violations of 
the antitrust laws.33 However, the tide changed; by the early 1980s the DOJ 
began to repudiate the Nine No-Nos which were replaced by the 1995 
Guidelines. The 1995 Guidelines basically take a rule of reason approach in 
the vast majority of cases. The per se illegal rule will only be applied in 
some cases where the courts have concluded that a restraint’s “nature and 
necessary effect are so plainly anticompetitive” and accorded it an unlawful 
per se treatment (such as naked price-fixing, output restraints, and market 
division among horizontal competitors, as well as certain group boycotts and 
resale price maintenance) and that particular restraint does not in fact 
contribute to an efficiency-enhancing integration of economic activity. As a 
matter of fact, these per se illegal agreements are already illegal due to being 
illegal cartel or prohibited by law. 
The EU TTBER follows the U.S. experiences and limits the hardcore 
clauses that are excluded from the benefit of block exemption and subject to 
individual assessment by the Commission to only the fixing of prices 
charged to third parties (Article 4).34 Even according to Paragraph 75 of the 
                                                                                                                            
 33.  
[T]he Nine No-Nos were: 1. Requiring a licensee to purchase unpatented materials from the 
licensor (tying). 2. Requiring a licensee to assign to the licensor patents issued to the 
licensee after the licensing arrangement is executed. 3. Restricting a purchaser of a patented 
product in the resale of that product. 4. Restricting a licensee’s freedom to deal in products 
or services outside the scope of the patent. 5. Agreeing with a licensee that the licensor will 
not, without the licensee’s consent, grant further licenses to any other person. 6. Requiring 
that the licensee accept a “package” license. 7. Requiring royalties not reasonably related to 
the licensee’s sales of products covered by the patent. 8. Restricting the licensee’s sales of 
(unpatented) goods made with the licensed patented process. 9. Requiring a licensee to 
adhere to specified or minimum prices in the sale of the licensed products. 
Daniel P. Homiller, Patent Misuse in Patent Pool Licensing: From National Harrow to “The Nine 
No-Nos” to Not Likely, DUKE L. & TECH. REV. ¶ 13 (2006), available at 
http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/dltr/articles/pdf/2006dltr0007.pdf.  
 34. Among other things, Article 4 of the EU TTBER provides:  
1. Where the undertakings party to the agreement are competing undertakings, the 
exemption provided for in Article 2 shall not apply to agreements which, directly or 
indirectly, in isolation or in combination with other factors under the control of the parties, 
have as their object: (a) the restriction of a party’s ability to determine its prices when selling 
products to third parties; . . . 2. Where the undertakings party to the agreement are not 
competing undertakings, the exemption provided for in Article 2 shall not apply to 
agreements which, directly or indirectly, in isolation or in combination with other factors 
under the control of the parties, have as their object: (a) the restriction of a party’s ability to 
determine its prices when selling products to third parties, without prejudice to the 
possibility of imposing a maximum sale price or recommending a sale price, provided that it 
does not amount to a fixed or minimum sale price as a result of pressure from, or incentives 
offered by, any of the parties . . . . 
EU TTBER, supra note 10, art. 4. 
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EU Guidelines, the Commission considers “that in the context of individual 
assessment hardcore restrictions will only in exceptional circumstances” 
fulfill the four conditions of the exception to the prohibition, and the term 
illegal per se was never used. 
In parallel to the above-mentioned development, the Taiwanese 
Guidelines completely abolished the per se illegal position in 2009. The 
determination of the listed examples of prohibited clauses in Point 6 is either 
subject to the condition that it is “in a manner sufficient to influence the 
functions of the relevant market” or it is “likely to lessen competition or to 
impede fair competition in relevant markets.” 
Nevertheless, for countries on the importing side of the IPR licensing 
trade and undertakings, the per se illegal rule might have a special attraction 
as a tool to strengthen their bargaining position vis-a-vis powerful licensors 
from advanced countries, and to bluntly refuse certain clauses and lessen the 
burden of proving anticompetitive effects.35 The Proposals for Amendment 
of TRIPS take a similar view in demanding members to take measures to 
prevent specific licensing practices without inquiring their anti-competitive 
effects: “Members shall adopt, consistently with the other provisions of this 
Agreement, appropriate measures to prevent or control such practices, which 
may include for example exclusive grantback conditions, conditions 
preventing challenges to validity and coercive package licensing, in the light 
of the relevant laws and regulations of the Member concerned.”36 
 
2. Per Se Legal Rule Remains a Rarity 
 
The per se legal rule, such as the White Clauses once enshrined in the 
EU TTBER, the Japanese Guidelines of 1999 and the still existing Point 5 in 
the Taiwanese Guidelines (Point 5), remains a rarity. Such a rule can turn out 
to be a straightjacket in practice, due to the fact that undertakings will be 
misled into believing that only those clauses listed are exempted and 
therefore avoid other clauses that are not listed, although they might in fact 




                                                                                                                            
 35. According to § 39(1) of the Thai Patent Act, patentees may not impose restriction or any 
royalty term which is unjustifiably anti-competitive. Restrictions or terms which are unjustifiably 
anti-competitive shall be prescribed in the Ministerial Regulations. Patent Act B.E. 2522, § 39(1) 
(1979) (amended 1999) (Thai.). 
 36. TRIPS, supra note 8, art. 40. 
 37. That is why the Max Planck Institute asserts in its Comments on the Draft Technology 
Transfer Block Exemption Regulation that with the abolition of the White Clauses, undertakings gain 
significantly more contractual leeway. See Drexl et al., supra note 3, at 188-89. 
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IV. PATENT POOLS IN THE ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL AUTHORITIES 
 
Patent pools are joint licensing agreements between plural right holders 
and licensees for a large number of patents with one royalty formula and 
package licensing of patents. This section will contrast the main viewpoints 
expressed by national agencies and thereby expose their common ground 




1. DOJ and FTC: Including Substitute Patents Not Presumptively 
Anticompetitive  
 
The U.S. Guidelines provide only a broad-brush assessment of patent 
pools: patent pool arrangements may provide procompetitive benefits by 
integrating complementary technologies, reducing transaction costs, clearing 
blocking positions, and avoiding costly infringement litigation. However, 
pooling arrangements can have anticompetitive effects in certain 
circumstances. For example, collective price or output restraints in pooling 
arrangements, such as the joint marketing of pooled IPR with collective 
price setting or coordinated output restrictions, may be deemed unlawful if 
they do not contribute to an efficiency-enhancing integration of economic 
activity among the participants.38 The Guidelines stop short of shedding 
light on the competitive effects of including substitutes within a patent pool. 
But the DOJ’s favorable business review letters regarding patent pools relied 
heavily on assurances from the parties that the pools contain only 
complementary patents; and the FTC’s Summit-VISX Complaint challenged 
the combining of patents in a pool that were alleged to cover substitute 
technologies.39  
However, the AE & IPR Report discusses this issue in detail and states 
that the Agencies’ previous guidance should not be interpreted to exclude the 
possibility of including some substitutes in the pool and the Agencies will 
consider the inclusion of some substitutes as one of the many factors in their 
rule of reason analysis of any pooling agreement. 40  In other words, 
including substitute patents in a pool does not make the pool presumptively 
anticompetitive; competitive effects will be ascertained on a case-by-case 
basis.41  
 
                                                                                                                            
 38. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 29, at 28. 
 39. AE & IPR REP., supra note 6, at 76. 
 40. Id. at 78. 
 41. Id. at 9. 
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2. CAFC: Rule of Reason Analysis of Any Pooling Agreement 
 
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (hereinafter ‘CAFC’) 
expresses a similar rule of reason analysis of any pooling agreement in the 
long-running dispute over the patent package licenses offered by U.S. 
Philips Corp. on behalf of the CD-R patent pool42 to compact disc makers, 
such as Princo, for compliance with the CD-R/RW standards.43After years of 
                                                                                                                            
 42. Philips, Sony and Taiyo Yuden have developed standards through a series of Red Book, 
Yellow Book and Orange Book, pooled their patents on CD-R together and started to jointly license 
the pooled patents through a Joint Licensing Agreement (JLA) in 1992 with one royalty formula: 3% 
of the net sales price and not lower than 10 JPY. Philips was designated as the sole contact for 
licensing the pooled patents. The market price of a CD-R at the time the licensing agreements were 
entered into was approximately 300 JPY. As the market price of CD-Rs dropped drastically. The retail 
price of a CD-R disc was around USD 50 to USD 60 when it was first put on market in the early 
1990s. When production started to gain momentum, the retail prices decreased to a level of around 
USD 10 to USD 15. By 1997, the trade price for a CD-R disc dropped significantly to around USD 
2.55. By 2000, the worldwide prices for a CD-R disc fell further to USD 0.44 and continue to fall to 
USD 0.2 in 2006. See Examination Procedure Concerning an Obstacle to Trade, Within the Meaning 
of Council Regulation (EC) No. 3286/94, Consisting of Measures Adopting by the Separate Customs 
Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu Affecting Patent Protection in Respect of Recordable 
Compact Discs, ¶¶ 34-35 (Jan. 30, 2008) [hereinafter TBR REP.], available at  
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2008/january/tradoc_137633.pdf. The minimum royalty of 10 
JPY became unbearable. However, Philips et al. refused to accommodate the repeated requests from 
Taiwanese licensees to lower the minimum royalty. Such licensing agreements and related practices 
have been challenged at least in Germany, Taiwan, and USA from the perspective of antitrust law. 
 43. At first the International Trade Commission (ITC) found Philips misused its patents, which 
was overruled by the CAFC. The CAFC remanded the case to the ITC for further proceedings because 
it had not addressed all the grounds on which the administrative law judge had based his ruling. On 
remand, the ITC first rejected Princo’s argument that Philips committed patent misuse by combining 
with its horizontal competitors to fix the price of patent licenses in the market for licensing CD-R/RW 
patents. The ITC found that there was no evidence in the record that the patents in the joint package 
licenses covered technologies that were close substitutes, or that the pool licensors would have 
competed in the technology licensing market absent the pooling arrangements. Consequently, the ITC 
found that the joint package licenses had not been shown to constitute horizontal price fixing. In 
particular, the ITC rejected Princo’s argument that Sony’s Lagadec patent should not have been 
included in the patent packages. The ITC noted Philips’s contention that claim 6 of the Lagadec patent 
covered a portion of the Orange Book standard and therefore was technically a “blocking patent,” and 
explained if Philips was correct that Lagadec was a necessary part of the Orange Book patent package, 
then “no misuse flows from including the [Lagadec] patent in the joint licenses.” Even if a license to 
the Lagadec patent was not necessary to manufacture Orange-Book-compliant discs, there was no 
merit to Princo’s theories of patent misuse based on the Lagadec patent, because “there has been no 
showing that the Lagadec…patent competes with another patent in the pool, no showing that the pool 
licensors would have competed in the technology licensing market absent the pooling arrangement, 
and no showing of the anti-competitive effect required under a rule of reason analysis.” With respect to 
the contention that including the Lagadec patent in the license packages enabled Philips to secure 
Sony’s adherence to the Orange Book standards and thereby foreclose competition, the ITC found it 
speculative and unsupported by the evidence. Because there was no evidence that Sony would have 
entered the CD-R/RW market with a system based on the Lagadec technology and no evidence that 
such a system would have become a significant competitive force in that market, the Commission held 
that theory insufficient to support a finding of patent misuse. On Princo’s appeal, a divided panel of 
the CAFC ruled against the ITC and Philips. Although the panel rejected several of Princo’s 
arguments, it vacated the ITC’s remedial orders and remanded the case for further proceedings on one 
issue: (1) whether Lagadec was a potentially workable alternative to the Orange Book technology and 
(2) whether Princo has established that Sony and Phillips agreed that Lagadec would not be licensed in 
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litigation, the CAFC, sitting en banc, upheld on 30 August 2010 the ITC’s 
rejection of Princo’s defense of patent misuse by an 8 to 2 vote for the 
following reasons and affirmed the ITC’s orders granting relief against 
Princo:  
(a) No Patent Misuse by Inducing a Third Party Not to License Its 
Separate, Competitive Technology 
Given that the patent grant entitles the patentee to impose a broad range 
of conditions in licensing the right to practice the patent, the doctrine of 
patent misuse “has largely been confined to a handful of specific practices by 
which the patentee seemed to be trying to ‘extend’ his patent grant beyond 
its statutory limits.”44 Patent misuse is not available to a presumptive 
infringer simply because a patentee engages in some kind of wrongful 
commercial conduct, even conduct that may have anticompetitive effects.45 
For the CAFC the decisive question was: When a patentee offers to 
license a patent, does he/she misuse that patent by inducing a third party not 
to license its separate, competitive technology? The CAFC opines that 
Princo has not pointed to any authority suggesting that such a scenario 
constitutes patent misuse, and nothing in the policy underlying the 
judge-made doctrine of patent misuse would support such a result.46 The 
Orange Book licensing agreements control what the licensees may do; the 
purported agreement between Philips and Sony controls what Sony may do. 
Princo’s underlying complaint is not that its license to the Raaymakers 
patents is unreasonably conditioned, but that the Lagadec patent has not been 
made available for non-Orange-Book uses. And that is not patent misuse 
under any court’s definition of the term. If the purported agreement between 
Philips and Sony not to license the Lagadec technology is unlawful, that can 
only be under antitrust law, not patent misuse law; nothing about that 
agreement, if it exists, constitutes an exploitation of the Raaymakers patents 
against Philips’ licensees.47 
(b) Agreement Not to License Competing Technology Analyzed Under 
the Rule of Reason  
Philips and Sony acted legitimately in choosing not to compete against 
                                                                                                                            
a manner allowing its development as competitive technology. See Princo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Com’n , 
563 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2009). Philips, Princo, and the ITC all filed petitions for rehearing en banc. 
The court granted the petitions filed by Philips and the ITC, but denied the petition filed by Princo. 
Although Philips and the ITC have raised a number of issues in their petitions and in their briefs on 
rehearing en banc, CAFC address only one—Philips’s argument that regardless of whether Philips and 
Sony agreed to suppress the technology embodied in Sony’s Lagadec patent, such an agreement would 
not constitute patent misuse and would not be a defense to Philips’s claim of infringement against 
Princo. 
 44. Princo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Com’n, 616 F.3d 1318, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 1331. 
 47. Id. at 1333.  
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their own joint venture. Princo failed to show that the asserted agreement 
had any anticompetitive effects because, as the ITC found, the Lagadec 
technology was not a viable potential competitor to the technology embodied 
in the Raaymakers patents. 48  Research joint ventures such as the one 
between Philips and Sony can have significant procompetitive features, and 
it is now well settled that an agreement among joint venturers to pool their 
research efforts is analyzed under the rule of reason.49 
Cooperation by competitors in standard-setting “can provide 
procompetitive benefits the market would not otherwise provide, by 
allowing a number of different firms to produce and market competing 
products compatible with a single standard.” Congress has recognized those 
procompetitive features and has directed that the activities of a “standards 
development organization while engaged in a standards development 
activity” are subject to the rule of reason.50 
What Princo had to demonstrate was that there was a “reasonable 
probability” that the Lagadec technology, if available for licensing, would 
have matured into a competitive force in the storage technology market. It 
was not enough that there was some speculative possibility that Lagadec 
could have overcome the barriers to its technical feasibility and commercial 
success and become the basis for competing disc technology.51 Princo has 
failed to show that the putative agreement between Sony and Philips not to 
license the Lagadec technology for non-Orange-Book purposes had any 
market effect at all—actual or prospective. The record and the findings of 
the ITC made it clear that the Lagadec technology lacked both the technical 
and the commercial prospects that would have made it a possible basis for a 




The EU TTBER is of the opinion that the vast majority of licensing 
agreements is pro-competitive,54 and therefore blocks exempt from the 
prohibition of Article 81(1) those technology transfer agreements that do not 
exceed the market thresholds and do not contain hardcore restrictions. 
                                                                                                                            
 48. Id. at 1334. 
 49. Id. at 1334-35. 
 50. Id. at 1335-36. 
 51. Id. at 1338. 
 52. Id. at 1340. For a well-grounded critique of the decision that abridged patent misuse and 
created gap with antitrust law, see Richard Li-Dar Wang, Deviated, Unsound, and Self-Retreating: A 
Critical Assessment of the Princo v. ITC en banc Decision, 16 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 51, 
51-79 (2012).  
 53. For a detailed overview of the EU situation, see GUY TRITTON, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN 
EUROPE 888-912 (3d ed. 2008). 
 54. Guidelines on the Application of Art. 81, supra note 11, ¶ 17. 
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Consequently, the EU TTBER moves away from the approach of listing 
exempted clauses to an economics-based approach that distinguishes 
agreements between competitors from agreements between non-competitors 
(Recital 4 EU TTBER).55 There is no presumption that technology transfer 
agreements falling outside of the block exemption are caught by Article 
81(1),56 they just need to be individually exempted by the Commission. 
 
1. Highly Intolerance of Patent Pools with Substitute Technologies  
 
As a general rule, the European Commission seems highly intolerant of 
patent pools which include substitute technologies and reverts almost to the 
illegal per se rule. According to the EU Guidelines, the competitive risks and 
the efficiency enhancing potential of technology pools depend to a large 
extent on the relationship between the pooled technologies and their 
relationship with technologies outside the pool. Therefore, two basic 
distinctions must be made: (a) between technological complements and 
substitutes; and (b) between essential and non-essential technologies.57  
For the Commission, the inclusion in the pool of substitute technologies 
restricts inter-technology competition and amounts to collective bundling. 
Moreover, where the pool is substantially composed of substitute 
technologies, the arrangement amounts to price fixing between competitors. 
As a general rule the Commission considers that the inclusion of substitute 
technologies in the pool constitutes a violation of Article 81(1). 58  In 
addition, when patent pools support an industry standard or establish a de 
facto industry standard, they can result in a reduction of innovation by 
foreclosing alternative technologies by making it more difficult for new and 
improved technologies to enter the market.59 
When a pool is composed only of technologies that are essential and 
therefore by necessity also complements, the creation of the pool as such 
generally falls outside Article 81(1), irrespective of the market position of 
the parties. However, the conditions on which licenses are granted may be 
                                                                                                                            
 55. EU TTBER, supra note 10, Recital 4. 
 56. Guidelines on the Application of Art. 81, supra note 11, ¶ 37. 
 57. Id. ¶ 215. Two technologies are complements when they are both required to produce the 
product or carry out the process to which the technologies relate. Conversely, two technologies are 
substitutes when either technology allows the holder to produce the product or carry out the process to 
which the technologies relate. A technology is essential if there are no substitutes for that technology 
inside or outside the pool and the technology in question constitutes a necessary part of the package of 
technologies for the purposes of producing the product or carrying out the process to which the pool 
relates. A technology, for which there are no substitutes, remains essential as long as the technology is 
covered by at least one valid IPR. See id. ¶ 216. 
 58. Id. ¶ 219. 
 59. Id. ¶ 213. 
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caught by Article 81(1). 60  For example, where non-essential but 
complementary patents are included in the pool there is a risk of foreclosure 
of third party competitive technologies. In addition, the inclusion of 
technologies which are not necessary for the purposes of producing the 
pool-related product(s) or carrying out the process(es) will also force 
licensees to pay for technology that they may not need. When a pool 
encompasses non-essential technologies, the agreement is likely to be caught 
by Article 81(1) where the pool has a significant position on any relevant 
market.61 
 
2. Refusal to License the Pooled IPR: Concern About Competition in 
the Downstream Market 
 
According to the EU Guidelines, pools that hold a strong position on the 
market should be open and non-discriminatory62 and where the pool has a 
dominant position on the market, royalties and other licensing terms should 
be fair and non-discriminatory and licenses should be non-exclusive.63 It 
remains to be seen whether “pools that hold a strong position on the market 
should be open and non-discriminatory” means no refusal to license the 
pooled IPR by patent pools with dominant market position. 
Noteworthy, however, is the “Guidance on the Commission’s 
enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive 
exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings” published on 9 February 
2009 (EU Guidance Paper).64 The EU Guidance Paper though only relates 
to abuses committed by single dominance (an undertaking holding a single 
dominant position) and excludes collective dominance (by two or more 
undertakings),65 lists refusal to supply as abuse among other specific forms 
of abuse, such as exclusive dealing, tying and bundling, predation and 
margin squeeze.66  
                                                                                                                            
 60. Id. ¶ 220. 
 61. Id. ¶ 221. 
 62. Id. ¶ 224. 
 63. Id. ¶ 226. 
 64. Communication from the Commission—Guidance on the Commission’s Enforcement Priorities 
in Applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to Abusive Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant Undertakings, 
2009 O.J. (C 45) 2, available at  
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2009:045:0007:0020:EN:PDF.  
 65. Id. ¶ 4. The Commission considers that low market shares are generally a good proxy for the 
absence of substantial market power. The Commission’s experience suggests that dominance is not 
likely if the undertaking’s market share is below 40% in the relevant market. See id. ¶ 14. 
 66. The EU Guidance Paper understands the concept of refusal to supply as covering a broad 
range of practices, such as a refusal to supply products to existing or new customers, refusal to license 
IPR, including when the license is necessary to provide interface information, or refusal to grant 
access to an essential facility or a network. See id. ¶ 78. Likewise, it is not necessary for there to be 
actual refusal on the part of a dominant undertaking; “constructive refusal” is sufficient. Constructive 
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The Commission will consider an enforcement priority if all the 
three following circumstances are present: “the refusal relates to a 
product or service that is objectively necessary for undertakings to 
be able to compete effectively in a downstream market, the refusal 
is likely to lead to the elimination of effective competition in the 
downstream market, and the refusal is likely to lead to consumer 
harm.67  
 
It is highly likely for the Commission to apply mutatis mutandis this 




1. Highly Intolerance of Patent Pools with Substitute Technologies 
 
According to the Japanese Guidelines, a patent pool can be useful in 
encouraging the effective use of technologies required for business activities 
and a patent pool itself does not immediately constitute an unreasonable 
restraint of trade. It is an unreasonable restraint of trade if the parties holding 
the rights to the substitute technologies in a particular technology market 
establish a patent pool and jointly set forth licensing conditions (including 
the scope of use of technologies) for their rights to substitute technologies 
and substantially restrain competition in the field of trade associated with 
these technologies. The Japanese Guidelines then refer to the scenario of a 
refusal to license by patent pools: “where entrepreneurs participating in a 
patent pool refuse to grant a license to any new entrant or any particular 
existing entrepreneurs without any reasonable grounds, to hinder it from 
using the technology, the restriction may fall under the exclusion of business 
activities of other entrepreneurs.”68  
                                                                                                                            
refusal could, for example, take the form of unduly delaying or otherwise degrading the supply of the 
product or involve the imposition of unreasonable conditions in return for the supply. See id. ¶ 79. 
 67. Id. ¶ 81. 
 68. GU, supra note 13, pt. 3(1)(i). In addition, consequent to the enactment of Law No. 51 of 2009 
for amending the Antimonopoly Act in June 2009, the JFTC formulates on 18 October 2009 the “the 
Guidelines for the Exclusionary Private Monopolization under the Antimonopoly Act,” which include 
refusal to supply as one of the four typical exclusionary conducts. The Japanese Exclusion Guidelines 
in principle respect an entrepreneur’s discretion to select to whom and on what conditions it supplies 
products. However, if an entrepreneur carries out, beyond reasonable degree, refusal to supply, 
imposing restriction on the quantity or contents, or applies discriminatory treatment to the condition or 
implementation of supply in the upstream market concerning a product necessary for the trading 
customers to carry out business activities in the downstream market, such conduct may cause 
difficulty in the business activities in the downstream market of the trading customers who are unable 
to easily find an alternative supplier in the upstream market, and may undermine competition in the 
downstream market. Thus, carrying out refusal beyond reasonable degree concerning a product 
necessary for the trading customers to carry out business activities in the downstream market may fall 
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2. If Refusal to License the Pooled IPR Substantially Restrains 
Competition: Private Monopolization  
 
The Japanese Guidelines also deal with the issue of refusal to license the 
pooled IPR s from the perspective of private monopolization pursuant the 
Antimonopoly Act. Restrictions by the right-holder to a technology such as 
not to grant a license for the use of the technology to an entrepreneur 
(including cases where the royalties requested are prohibitively expensive 
and the licensor’s conduct is in effect equivalent to a refusal to license) is 
seen as an exercise of rights and normally constitutes no problem. However, 
if any such restriction is found to deviate from or run counter to the intent 
and objectives of the IPR systems, it is not recognizable as an exercise of 
rights. It then constitutes private monopolization if it substantially restrains 
competition in a particular field of trade and an infringement of Article 3 
(prohibition of private monopolization or unreasonable restraint of trade) 
occurs.69 In practice, in the 1997 pachinko game machines case the JFTC 
has found the refusal to license patents owned by 10 
pachinko-manufacturing companies and administered by an association 
(Japan Amusement Machine Patent Managing Federation) to other 





1. Patent Pools with Substitute Technologies Likely to be Unjust 
 
If the technologies included in the patent pool are a substitute for one 
another, the exercise of rights related to such patent pool is likely to be 
determined as unjust. In addition, if unessential or invalid patents are 
included in the joint working of patents, there is a high possibility that the 
exercise of rights related to the relevant patent pool will be determined as 
unjust as it can increase a licensee’s costs and unfairly allow invalid patents 
to exist.71 
 
                                                                                                                            
under exclusionary conduct. See JAPAN FAIR TRADE COMM’N, THE GUIDELINES FOR THE 
EXCLUSIONARY PRIVATE MONOPOLIZATION UNDER THE ANTIMONOPOLY ACT 5, 25 (2009) 
[hereinafter Japanese Exclusion Guidelines], available at  
http://www.jftc.go.jp/en/legislation_guidelines/ama/pdf/guidelines_exclusionary.pdf. 
 69. GU, supra note 13, pt. 3(1). 
 70. Wakui, supra note 30, at 92-93. 
 71. Review Guidelines on Undue Exercise of Intellectual Property Rights 17 (2000) (amended 
2010) (S. Kor.), available at  
http://eng.ftc.go.kr/files/static/Legal_Authority/Review%20Guidelines%20on%20Undue%20Exercise
%20of%20Intellectual%20Property%20Rights.pdf. 
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2. Refusal to License Pooled IPR: Concerned About Fair Trade in the 
Relevant Market 
 
Act of unfairly rejecting the grant of license to non-participants in the 
patent pool or signing a license agreement with such non-participants on 
discriminatory conditions which threaten to impede fair trade in the relevant 





1. Much Emphasis on Not Including Substitute Patents in Patent Pool 
 
The Taiwanese Guidelines do not address the issue of patent pool at all. 
However, the TFTC has held that patent pools comprising of potentially 
substitutable patents by competitors, such as that between Philips, Sony and 
Taiyo Yuden (with a uniform royalty rate and a sole licensing channel), are 
cartel in disguise. However, the Taipei Administrative High Courts overruled 
on the following grounds: Local CD-R manufacturers must use all the 
patents owned by Philips et al in order to make CD-R; Using patents of any 
one of the three companies would not be sufficient to manufacture CD-R; 
therefore, patents owned by Philips et al were complementary in nature and 
every pooled patent was indispensable, which made the patented technology 
no longer substitutable, therefore no horizontal competitive relationship 
exited between Philips et al and Article 14 of the FTA that bans cartel could 
not be applied. The Taipei Administrative High Court’s finding of “no 
substitutability for the patented technology and no competition relationship 
between Philips et al” was upheld by the Supreme Administrative Court as 
“ascertaining the facts according to the law.”73 
On 30 March 2011 the TFTC cleared the first patent pool that sought its  
 
 
                                                                                                                            
 72. Id. at 16, 18. 
 73. For more details of the case and some critique, see Kung-Chung Liu & Wei-Ke Chien, CD-R 
An chih Chiehhsi yu Pingshih─Yi Kungpingfa chi Chuanli Chiangchih Shouchuan wei Chunghsin 
[Analysis of and Comments on CD-R-related Cases: Focusing on Competition Law and Patent 
Compulsory Licensing Issues], KUNGPING CHIAOYI CHIKAN [FAIR TRADE Q.], Jan. 2009, at 1-37; 
Shiow-Ming Wu, Chuanli Lienmeng yu Kungpingfa chih Lienhe Hsingwei Kuanchih─Yi “Feilipu 
Kuangtieh An” chung Tiaokuei te Chingcheng Kuanhsi wei Hehsin, Shang [Patent Pool and the 
Regulation of Cartel According to the Fair Trade Act, Part I], YUEHTAN FAHSUEH TSACHIH [TAIWAN 
L. REV.], Nov. 2009, at 120-35; Shiow-Ming Wu, Chuanli Lienmeng yu Kungpingfa chih Lienhe 
Hsingwei Kuanchih─Yi “Feilipu Kuangtieh An” chung Tiaokuei te Chingcheng Kuanhsi wei 
Hehsin, Hsia [Patent Pool and the Regulation of Cartel According to the Fair Trade Act, Part II], 
YUEHTAN FAHSUEH TSACHIH [TAIWAN L. REV.], Dec. 2009, at 85-101. 
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approval. The TFTC decided not to oppose the merger between Hitachi, 
Panasonic, Philips, Samsung, Sony and CyberLink which takes the form of a 
new company, One-Blue, with each company controlling one-sixth of its 
share. One-Blue will act as a licensing agent for the patent pool to license 
essential blue-ray disc (BD) patents for the manufacturing of back-ward 
compatible BD products (such as CD, DVD etc.). One-Blue assures that (1) 
the patent pool will be composed exclusively of patents that will be 
periodically reviewed by independent patent experts (selected by the 
Administrative Commission from independent and professional patent 
experts of different countries. The patent experts will provide their patent 
evaluation service on an hourly charge basis and the outcome of their 
evaluations on the patents essentiality have nothing to do with their 
compensations for the service) to be necessary, complementary and valid; (2) 
the patent pool will be open to all patent holders; (3) licensors of the patent 
pool are required to conduct individual licensing activities to any licensee on 
a FRAND (fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory terms) basis; (4) 
licensors of the patent pool are prohibited from disclosing their confidential 
information, and shall not get access to licensee’s information provided in 
the application of per-batch license before each shipment of product; (5) 
grant back is limited to essential patents, the royalties will be paid under the 
same royalty rate as the patent pool, and licensors of such grant back 
licensing are free to individually license their patents. 
In order to ensure that the overall economic benefit of the merger 
outweighs the disadvantages resulting from competition restraints and to 
ensure that participating parties will not restrain competition through the 
patent pool, the TFTC imposes the following conditions on participating 
parties and One-Blue74: (1) Not to engage in any concerted action by 
entering into any agreement that restricts the quantities or prices of the BD 
products or by exchanging important transaction information; (2) Not to 
restrict licensees’ use of technology, trading counterparts and product prices; 
(3) Not to restrict licensees from challenging the essentiality and validity of 
the licensed patents; (4) Not to restrict licensees from researching and 
developing, manufacturing, using and selling the competitive products 
and/or adopting competitive technologies within the license term or after the 
expiration of the license; (5) Not to refuse to provide licensees with the 
content, scope and term of the licensed patents; (6) To provide executed 
copies of the pool agreements for the TFTC’s review.75 
It is evident that the TFTC puts much emphasis on the fact that 
substitute patents are not included in the patent pool, and strives to avoid 
                                                                                                                            
 74. Fair Trde Comm’n, Kungchieh No. 100002 (Mar. 31, 2011) (Taiwan), available at  
http://www.ftc.gov.tw/uploadDecision/fc229308-2070-4498-9f4e-a845bcea7c55.pdf. 
 75. Id. 
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restraint of licensees’ freedom to decide prices, use or challenge the pooled 
patents, and to research and develop competitive products or technologies. In 
addition, it is noteworthy that the TFTC abandons its prior skepticism about 
the sole licensing channel through a particular pool member it exhibited 
against the CD-R patent pool and concludes that “Therefore, licensing the 
essential BD patents through a patent pool is expected to make it easier for 
Taiwanese manufactures to obtain the license of essential patents, to lower 
the transaction cost and to avoid the risk of infringement and litigation, 
which will make it easier for Taiwanese manufactures to compete with each 
other for consumer’s interest.” 
 
2. Refusal to License Pooled IPR via Refusing Royalty Negotiation: 
Abuse of Monopolistic Position 
 
The Taiwanese Guidelines do not deal with the abuse of monopolistic 
market power derived from patent pools. However, the CD-R cases 
prompted the TFTC to interpret and apply Article 10 (abuse of monopolistic 
market power) to the refusal to license the pooled patents. In 2000, Philips et 
al were accused of abusing their monopoly power in the CD-R market 
through the JLA by demanding excessive royalties and obscuring 
information about the patents to be licensed. Philips et al were further 
accused of engaging in cartels by bundling patents and licensing in 
packages, tying in patents that had already expired. In January 2001 the 
TFTC found that Philips et al had a joint monopoly power in the CD-R 
patent-licensing technology market because they own all the important 
patents for the manufacture of CD-R. From the drastic price drop and the 
sixty-fold growth in volume worldwide, the TFTC concluded that the 
maintenance of the minimum royalty of 10 JPY and the refusal to negotiate 
on a royalty scheme to match the market situation would give rise to the 
situation where Philips et al would earn royalties between twenty to sixty 
times more than the expected amount; hence Philips et al were guilty of 
abusing their joint monopoly power and violated Article 10(2) of the FTA. 
The Taipei Administrative High Court and the Supreme Administrative Court 
concurred with this finding.76 
                                                                                                                            
 76. Fair Trade Comm’n, Kungchu No. 098156 (Oct. 20, 2009) (Taiwan), available at  
http://www.ftc.gov.tw/uploadDecision/faed94a8-34ce-4f8e-b59a-239a9eaece1d.pdf. The TFTC’s 
determination of the relevant product market has not been upheld. But on remand the TFTC reached 
the same conclusions, which was appealed to and upheld by the Executive Yuan, the Taipei 
Administrative High Court and the Administrative Supreme Court. However, the Taipei 
Administrative High Court took into consideration the fact that the TFTC imposed different fines on 
Philips, Sony and Taiyo Yuden respectively in one administrative decision (not three administrative 
decisions) and found itself unable to render an “affirmed-in-part, vacated-in-part” decision and instead 
compelled to rescind the TFTC’s decision as a whole. Both the TFTC and Phillips et al. appealed the 
case to the Supreme Administrative Court which rejected the appeal in 2007 and the retrial appeal by 
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V. MAJOR DIFFERENCE—HOW TO LOOK UPON AND HARMONIZE IT 
 
The following analysis will identify the area where countries are most 
divided, arguably the abuse of a dominant position by patent pools, and 
discuss how we should look upon the major difference and harmonize it via 
the governance of patent pools. 
 
A. The Dividing Line: Abuse of a Dominant Position by Patent Pools 
 
There is a fundamental difference between U.S. and European antitrust 
law, namely that U.S. antitrust law does not have any specific regulation on 
the abuse of dominant position while the European antitrust law (mirrored by 
countries including China, Japan, Korea, and Taiwan) does. According to the 
latter, it is not in itself illegal for an undertaking to be in a dominant position 
and such a dominant undertaking is entitled to compete on its merits. 
However, a dominant undertaking has a special responsibility not to allow its 
conduct to impair genuine undistorted competition in the market. Patent 
pools often give rise to a dominant position in the licensing (or technology) 
market which in turns triggers the issue of the abuse of such dominance.77 
The abuse of dominance is commonly embodied in the form of refusal to 
license and charging prohibitive royalty.  
 
1. Refusal to License 
 
The unilateral, unconditional refusal to license patents by individual 
patentee is a core part of the patent grant. Accordingly, the AE & IPR 
REPORT states “Antitrust liability for mere unilateral, unconditional refusals 
to license patents will not play a meaningful part in the interface between 
patent rights and antitrust protections.” 78 However, the unilateral, 
                                                                                                                            
the TFTC in 2009. So the case was remanded back to the TFTC for further treatment. On 29 October 
2009 the TFTC again comes to the same conclusion that Philips et al. had violated Articles 10(2) and 
(4) of the FTA in the following exploitative abuse of monopoly power: refusing to renegotiate royalty 
with licensees while there have been significant changes on the market. For more details, see 
Kung-Chung Liu, The Taiwanese “Philips” CD-R Cases: Abuses of a Monopolistic Position, Cartel 
and Compulsory Patent Licensing, in LANDMARK INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CASES AND THEIR 
LEGACY 83-104 (Christopher Heath & Anselm Kamperman Sanders eds., 2010). 
 77. For jurisdictions that have special regulation on dominance, there exist also thresholds of 
sorts. Under the Japanese Exclusion Guidelines, the JFTC will prioritize the case where the share of 
the product that the said entrepreneur supplies exceeds approximately 50% after the commencement 
of such conduct and where the conduct is deemed to have a serious impact on the lives of the citizenry, 
comprehensively considering the relevant factors such as market size, scope of business activities of 
the said entrepreneur, and characteristics of the product. For the European Commission dominance is 
not likely if the undertaking’s market share is below 40% in the relevant market. See supra note 64, ¶ 
14.  
 78. AE & IPR REP., supra note 6, at 6. However, AE & IPR Report continues to say on the same 
page that “conditional refusals to license that cause competitive harm are subject to antitrust liability,” 
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unconditional refusal to license by patent pools, especially those holding 
dominant market position cannot be equally harmless, especially in 
jurisdictions with abuse-of-dominance antitrust law. 79  The AE & IPR 
REPORT in the context of patent pools is only willing to recall that the DOJ 
relied on the representations made by pool proponents that the license 
agreement would be available to all interested licensees.80  
Under what conditions will a refusal to license by patent pools with 
dominant market power constitute an abuse of dominance? The German 
Supreme Court in the “Orange-Book-Standard” has drawn a fine line that 
can be followed by other countries with European-style antitrust law: 
dominant patent pools only abuse their dominant market position and act 
faithlessly when the following two conditions have been satisfied: (1) the 
license-seeking party must have made an unconditional offer to sign a 
licensing agreement and abided by the offer, which the patentee if refused to 
accept would have inequitably excluded the license-seeking party or violated 
the prohibition of discrimination; (2) the license-seeking party who has 
already used the patent must abide by the obligations which the to-be-signed 
licensing agreement attaches to the use of the licensed object, before the 
patentee accepts the offer. This means in particular that the license-seeking 
party must pay or guarantee the payment of royalties resulting from the 
licensing agreement (Paragraph 29 of the Orange-Book-Standard decision).81 
An issue related to the refusal to license by patent pools is the refusal to 
grant partial-pool licenses. Its competitive effects are discussed below.  
 
2. Charging Prohibitive Royalty 
 
Collective royalty setting is an integral part of pooling agreements for 
the avoidance of royalty stacking with individual IPR holders charging 
royalties on top of royalties already charged by other IPR holders (double 
marginalization),which would make royalties prohibitively high. Collective 
royalty setting can also send out a clear price signal to on-lookers who are 
contemplating entering the market but are hesitant due to the uncertainty of 
royalties.  
However, royalty set by patent pools can be excessive. Based on Article 
102 TFEU, the European Court of Justice is prepared to find that an 
excessive royalty is an abuse of dominant position as it pronounced in the 
1987 Basset v. SACEM case (Case 402/85) that “it was possible that the 
                                                                                                                            
without giving any specific example of such conditional refusals.  
 79. TRITTON, supra note 53, at 1075-77. 
 80. See AE & IPR REP., supra note 6, at 71-72. 
 81. Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] May 6, 2009, NEUE JURISTISCHE 
WOCHENSCHRIFT RECHTSPRECHUNG-REPORT ZIVILRECHT [NJW-RR] 1049, 2009 (Ger.). 
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level of royalty fixed by a copyright society is such that Article 82 may be 
applied”.82In contrast, the U.S. DOJ and FTC will not generally assess the 
reasonableness of royalties set by a pool and their analysis will focus on the 
pool’s formation and whether its structure would likely enable pool 
participants to impair competition. 83  Nor does the CAFC accept the 
“assumption that a license to fewer than all the patents in a package would 
presumably carry a lower fee than the package” because it “ignores the 
reality that the value of any patent package is largely, if not entirely, based 
on the patents that are essential to the technology in question.”84 “It is 
entirely rational for a patentee who has a patent that is essential to particular 
technology, as well as other patents that are not essential, to charge what the 
market will bear for the essential patent and to offer the others for free.”85 
Following that line of thought, the AE & IPR Report concludes that:  
 
In general, a refusal to license less than all of a pool’s intellectual 
property will not raise competitive concerns, provided that the 
licensors retain the ability to license their patents individually and 
the pool’s design is otherwise procompetitive. In this way, licensees 
are not required to purchase access to more technology than they 
need.86 
 
In setting royalties, there are at least two ways of doing so, that is. 
percentage-wise or by charging a fixed amount. Royalty by percentage can 
fluctuate with the price levels on the market and is very popular,87 but 
suffers from licensees underreporting the prices they sold the patented 
products. Conversely, fixed amounts of royalty protect the minimum returns 
collectable for licensors, but are equally plagued with licensees 
underreporting product volume sold. However, fixed amounts of royalty by 
patent pools are likely subject to stricter examination in the event that the 
prices of the patented product fall significantly such that the fixed amount of 
royalty results in an abusive use of dominant market power. 
In addition, collective royalty setting should not prevent licensees of 
patent pools from only choosing and paying for patents that they actually 
need, in order to avoid tie-in, unfairness against technologically more 
advanced licensees, and the foreclosure of (potentially) competitive 
                                                                                                                            
 82. TRITTON, supra note 53, at 1074-75. 
 83. AE & IPR REP., supra note 6, at 9. 
 84. U.S. Philips Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 424 F.3d 1179, 1191 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 85. Id. 
 86. AE & IPR REP., supra note 6, at 84. 
 87. In Germany, the remuneration of employees for their contribution to the granted patents 
owned by the companies they work for is commonly calculated according to percentage. See ORTWIN 
HELLEBRAND ET AL., LIZENZSÄTZE FÜR TECHNISCHE ERFINDUNGEN 57-76 (2006). 
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technology. The EU Guidelines (Paragraph. 229), Japanese Guidelines (Part 
4-5-(4)), Korean Guidelines (p. 18), and the Taiwanese Guidelines (Point 
6(2)(xii)) are all very mindful of the risk that invalid patents may be included 
in the package, which would force licensees to pay higher royalties and 
prevent innovation in the field covered by the invalid patents. Consequently, 
the practice of package licensing “essential” and “non-essential” patents at 
one price will seem to be questionable in these jurisdictions.88 
 
B. How to Look Upon Differences 
 
To some people differences between jurisdictions are a source of legal 
uncertainty and costs and would see their complete eradication as the most 
desirable result of comparative legal study. However, differences reflect 
divergent legal background and social values. Therefore no one law and 
treatment of patent pools is in itself better than the other and demands 
deference. A forced unification of differences would not only impair national 
sovereignty, but also neglects and possibly even negate the potential they 
might hold for solving the pooling problems in the future.89 Bearing in mind 
the major difference identified in the preceding subsection, the following 
discussion will deal with the issue of patent pool governance and hope to use 
this as an effective vehicle to bridge the difference. 
 
C. The Governance of Patent Pools  
 
Despite the widely acknowledged integrative efficiency-enhancing 
benefits, patent pools consisting of substitutes held by competitors can 
facilitate horizontal collusion that would reduce price and inter-technology 
competition and lead to margin squeeze. 90  Patent pools comprised of 
complementary and non-essential patents raise the danger of foreclosing 
third party new R&D and innovation and forcing licensees to pay for 
technology that they may not need. To offset these perils and maximize the 
                                                                                                                            
 88. For example, Philips offered four different pools of patents for licensing: (1) a joint CD-R 
patent pool that included patents owned by Philips and two other companies (Sony and Taiyo Yuden); 
(2) a joint CD-RW patent pool that included patents owned by Philips and two other companies (Sony 
and Ricoh); (3) a CD-R patent pool that included only patents owned by Philips; and (4) a CD-RW 
patent pool that included only patents owned by Philips. After 2001 Philips offered additional package 
options by grouping its patents into two categories, “essential” and “nonessential” for producing 
compact discs compliant with the technical standards set forth in the Orange Book. The “essential” 
and “nonessential” patents are licensed in package; however licensees do not have to pay any 
additional royalty fee for “nonessential” patents. See U.S. Philips Corp., 424 F.3d at 1182. 
 89 .  Hanns Ullrich, Patent Pools—Policy and Problems, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND COMPETITION LAW 139, 161 (Joseph Drexl ed., 2008). 
 90. Rudolf Peritz, Competition Policy and Its Implications for Intellectual Property Rights in the 
United States, in THE INTERFACE BETWEEN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND COMPETITION 
POLICY 214-15 (Steven D. Anderman ed., 2007).  
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pro-competitive effects of patent pools, first and foremost, patent pools must 
be subject to good governance. Good governance of patent pools requires at 
least an independent oversight mechanism with internal and external 
openness and firewalls. 
 
1. Independent Patent Controller 
 
Without exception, the patent pools to whom the U.S. DOJ issued 
business review letters have all engaged an independent expert to exclude 
substitute technologies and to admit to the pool only those complementary 
patents essential to manufacturing products complying with the product 
standards.91 The One-Blue patent pool is the latest case in point. It is 
therefore imperative to have a neutral third party expert, both technically and 
financially not bound by the patent pools, to conduct technical evaluation, 
either upon his own initiative or request, with regard to the essentiality and 
substitutability of the pooled patents and confidential know-how.92 With an 
independent patent controller put in place, the related legality elaborations 




Openness of patent pools can ease the burden of competent agencies in 
discerning procompetitive ones from the anti-competitive and help prevent 
patent pools from denaturing into cartels and means to monopolizing the 
market. To ensure external openness, patent pools should allow licensors to 
retain the right to license their patents individually and the license agreement 
should be available to all interested licensees.94 With respect to internal 
openness, patent pools should provide a clear understanding of the contents 
                                                                                                                            
 91. AE & IPR REP., supra note 6, at 71. 
 92. Guidelines on the Application of Art. 81, supra note 11, ¶¶ 225, 232. See also Wakui, supra 
note 30, at 101. 
 93. Art. 5 (1)(c) of the EU TTBER states that any direct or indirect obligation on the licensee not 
to challenge the validity of IPRs held by the licensor shall not be block exempted, provided that 
without prejudice to the possibility of terminating the technology transfer agreement in the event that 
the licensee challenges the validity of one or more of the licensed IPR. Point 7 of the Taiwanese 
Guidelines provides that licensing arrangements that involve restrictions on the licensee’s ability to 
challenge the validity of the licensed technology and are likely to restrain competition or to impede 
fair competition in relevant markets would probably contravene Article 19(6) of the FTA. In practice, 
the TFTC found the demand by Philips et al. that the Taiwanese licensees withdraw their invalidity 
applications against patents held by Philips et al. as a precondition for concluding the licensing 
contracts an improper exercise of patent rights and amounted to exploitative abuse of monopoly power 
derived from such patents and therefore violated Art. 10(4) of the FTA. The Taipei Administrative 
High Court and the Administrative Supreme Court concurred with the TFTC on its ruling. For more 
details, see Fair Trade Comm’n, supra note 75.  
 94. See AE & IPR REP., supra note 6, at 71-72. See also Wakui, supra note 30, at 102-03. 
2012]  A More Economic and Cross-Jurisdiction Study on Patent Pools 79 
 
of the license,95 and the scope, terms and number of the patents owned by 




An antithesis to internal openness needs to be mentioned, namely the 
necessity to establish firewalls within patent pools. Often, in the names of 
overcoming underreporting by the licensee and calculating accurate royalty, 
competitively sensitive information such as pricing and output data and sales 
reports are asked to be provided to the pool administrator or licensors.97 The 
exchange or provision of such information will lead to collusion among 
patent pool members who are (potential) competitors. To preempt such 
attempts, there should be a safeguard mechanism installed in patent pools to 
prevent the departments other than the one overseeing the execution of 
licensing agreements from gaining access to the business secrets of others 
and using them to gain competitive advantages. In the US, the MPEG-2 
patent pool hired an independent licensing administrator so that the licensors 
would not be privy to information gathered from other pool participants; in 
both DVD patent pools, the parties designed “walls” to sufficiently limit 
access to each other’s sensitive information.98  
Out of similar concerns for the institutional framework governing pool 
management, the EU Guidelines state:  
                                                                                                                            
 95. AE & IPR REP., supra note 6, at 72. 
 96. The TFTC has found Philips et al. elusive about important trading information, such as the 
contents, scope, terms and number of patents they individually owned and constituted a so-called 
exploitative abuse of monopoly power and therefore violated Article 10(4) of the FTA. The Taipei 
Administrative High Court and the Administrative Supreme Court concurred with the TFTC’s ruling. 
See Zuigao Hsingcheng Fayuan [Sup. Admin. Ct.], 96 Pan No. 553 (2007) (Taiwan).  
 97. In Taiwan an actual legal case was fought over the legality of the licensor’s demanding of the 
list of manufacturing equipments and the sales reports to be provided by the licensee. The TFTC was 
of the opinion that such demand was categorically illegal, a violation of the general clause against 
unfair competition, namely Article 24 of the FTA (“in addition to what is provided for in this Law, no 
enterprise shall otherwise have any deceptive or obviously unfair conduct sufficient to affect trading 
order.”) and fined Philips NTD 6 million for imposing such demand on its CD-R patents licensees in 
Taiwan, see Taiwan Fair Trade Comm’n, Kungchu No. 095045 (2006) (Taiwan). However, the Taipei 
Administrative High Court did not see the “list of manufacturing equipments, suppliers, dates of 
installing and testing” as trade secrets of the licensees because the licensor knew already the 
manufacturing procedures (the same across all CD-R manufacturers) and equipments, and many other 
factors (e.g. orders, actual work dispatch and operation, and prices of dyes and PCs) contributed to the 
price determination of CD-R. At the same time, the Court found a violation of Article 24 of the FTA in 
Philips’ demanding of the information about the identification of CD-R buyers and the trademarks 
used by the buyers to be contained in the “written sales report.” For the Court these were sensitive 
business information and unrelated to the calculation of royalty, not even after taking into account of 
the common phenomenon of underreporting by the licensees, which can be dealt with through other 
lawful means. The Supreme Administrative Court upheld this decision. The Supreme Administrative 
Court rejected both the appeals filed by the TFTC and Philips for their failing to raise an issue of law, 
see Zuigao Hsingcheng Fayuan [Sup. Admin. Ct.], 99 Tsai No. 2028 (2010) (Taiwan).  
 98. AE & IPR REP., supra note 6, at 82. 
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In oligopolistic markets exchanges of sensitive information such as 
pricing and output data may facilitate collusion. In such cases the 
Commission will take into account to what extent safeguards have 
been put in place, which ensures that sensitive information is not 
exchanged. An independent expert or licensing body may play an 
important role in this respect by ensuring that output and sales data, 
which may be necessary for the purposes of calculating and 
verifying royalties is not disclosed to undertakings that compete on 
affected markets.99  
 
VI. THE IMPACT OF ANTITRUST VIOLATION BY PATENT POOLS ON IPR  
 
A. On the Cease-and-Decease Request Based on IPR 
 
As a relevant issue caught in the intersection between IPR and 
competition law is whether the cease-and-decease request based on IPR is 
barred by the determination of an antitrust law violation on the part of the 
IPR-holder In the US, the answer would likely be the affirmative if a patent 
misuse has been determined under competition law on the ground that the 
patentee has asserted the patent in an anticompetitive way, akin to an 
antitrust violation. As long as the patent owner is using his patent in 
violation of the antitrust laws, he cannot restrain infringement of it by others. 
This is also otherwise known as the unenforceability of patents. The German 
Supreme Court answered a similar question (whether the cease-and-decease 
request based on Article 139(1) of the German Patent Act can be countered 
by a claim derived from competition law, namely Article 33(1) of the 
Anti-Cartel Law in combination with Article 82 EC or Articles 19 and 20 of 
the Anti-Cartel Law) also positively in the “Orange-Book-Standard” case 
with a rather simple reason: Behavior that is prohibited by competition law 
cannot be ordered by the courts. It further reasoned that when a dominant 
undertaking discriminates against the license-seeking undertaking or 
inequitably excludes it by refusing to accept its offer to signing a licensing 
agreement, then the enforcement of the cease-and-decease request according 
to the Patent Act by the dominant undertaking would be an abuse of the 
dominant market position (Paragraph 27 Orange-Book-Standard).100  
 
B. On IPR Licensing Agreement 
 
In cases where IPR licensing agreements have been found by the 
                                                                                                                            
 99. Guidelines on the Application of Art. 81, supra note 11, ¶ 234. 
 100. Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] May 6, 2009, NEUE JURISTISCHE 
WOCHENSCHRIFT RECHTSPRECHUNG-REPORT ZIVILRECHT [NJW-RR], 1049, 2009 (Ger.). 
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authorities as violating antitrust law, what impact would it have on such 
agreements? At least the royalty should be adjusted in accordance with 
equitable estimation to a certain degree that would complement the IPR with 
competition law. Bewilderingly, the question has first been answered 
negatively by the Taiwan Intellectual Property Court (IP Court) with very 
straightforward reasoning: the licensing agreement is valid notwithstanding 
the fact that abusively high royalty demanded by a dominant patent pool has 
violated the FTA.101 Among its flawed reasoning,102 above all, it contradicts 
the final decision of the administrative courts which found abuse of 
collective monopoly power by improperly maintaining high royalties via the 
continual charge of the same high royalties. 
In contrast, the German Supreme Court correctly acknowledges a 
co-relationship between antitrust law and patent law in the 
“Orange-Book-Standard” decision and came to a different conclusion in a 
similar case: damages that the patentee can demand from an unauthorized 
infringer who has a right to compulsory license according to the competition 
law are limited to an amount that is uncontroversial according to the German 
Anti-Cartel Law.103 So long as the infringer has made an unconditional offer 
                                                                                                                            
 101. The Hsinchu District Court first suspended the royalty payment suit brought by Philips 
against its former licensee Princo due to the then pending antitrust cases brought by Princo against 
Philips. The Hsinchu District Court came to a decision on 15 August 2008 and awarded Philips the full 
royalty of 2,353,850,000 JPY (calculated by 10 JPY per CD-R produced by Princo, total number of 
production: 235,385,000), with a monthly interest of 2% as agreed in the licensing agreement for the 
belated payment. A monthly interest of 2% equals an annual interest of 24%, despite the fact that the 
Supreme Administrative Court, the Taipei Administrative High Court and the TFTC all found that 
Philips violated the FTA by refusing to negotiate royalty and hence maintaining improperly high 
royalty with Princo. The Intellectual Property Court concurred and did not question the 
unreasonableness of the royalty either, see Chihhui Tsaichan Fayuan [Intell. Prop. Ct.], 97 Minchuan 
Shang No. 14 (Apr. 23, 2009) (Taiwan). 
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and Taiyo Yuden by the ratio of 7:2:1. If this ratio is merit-based, i.e. in line with each company’s 
contribution to the patent pool, then starting from the 1 unit of USD 700,000 royalty due to Taiyo 
Yuden, royalty for Philips could be calculated by seven times of 1 unit of USD 700,000, namely about 
USD 4,900,000. But in comparison, the Intellectual Property Court awarded Philips USD 
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payment to be paid by the licensees of Philips et al. is far too high by any measure and possibly also 
the result of the abuse of joint monopoly power. 
 103. According to the German Supreme Court, even this number is not readily clear for the 
infringer, it does not constitute an inequitable burden on him, because in principle he is already 
obliged to bear the burden of explanation and proof in order to satisfy the requirements for claiming a 
right to a (compulsory) license from the patentee. See Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of 
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to acquire a license from the patentee and deposited a sufficient amount for 
the benefit of the patentee at the court,104 the court in charge of the patent 
infringement case can make the determination that the patentee is obliged to 
accept the offer for a licensing agreement and to decide equitably on the 
payable royalty.105 
On appeal, the Taiwanese Supreme Court annulled the decision by the 
Taiwan IP Court on the ground that the applicable law had not been correctly 
chosen and remanded the case back to it.106 This time the Taiwan IP Court 
reasoned that whenever the basic terms of a contract have been regulated or 
prohibited by public action and if enforced could lead to obviously unfair 
situations, then courts are entitled to resort to the principles of “change of 
circumstances (or the discontinuance of the basis of contract)” and “equity” 
to increase, decrease the amount of payment or to alter the original effects of 
the contract. It therefore exercised its discretionary and reduced the royalty 
from 10 to 3 JPY to eradicate the obvious unfairness.107 
 
VII. FUTURE PROSPECTS 
 
A. The Transparency of Patent Pools toward Competition Authorities 
 
Patent pools involve substantial amount of patents, one would not 
expect all members and licensees to use all of them. “This makes it harder to 
distinguish between innocuous pools from those meant to reduce 
competition. In addition, the number of patents involved multiplies the 
potential for ‘multi-market contact’ between pool members, making tacit 
collusion easier to support. It is therefore paramount to make patent pool 
                                                                                                                            
Justice] May 6, 2009, NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT RECHTSPRECHUNG-REPORT 
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[G], Oct. 26, 2007, BGBL I at 2513, art. 11(2) (Ger.); BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCHN [BGB] [Civil 
Code], Aug. 19, 1896, REICHSGESETZBLATT [RGBL.] 195, as amended, §315, para. 1 (Ger.). 
 105.  Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] May 6, 2009, NEUE JURISTISCHE 
WOCHENSCHRIFT RECHTSPRECHUNG-REPORT ZIVILRECHT [NJW-RR] 1051, 2009 (Ger.). 
 106. Zuigao Fayuan [Sup. Ct.], Civil Division, 98 Taishang No. 1933 (2009) (Taiwan).  
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agreements transparent to competition authorities,”108 which can ex office 
pass them on to their counterparts in jurisdictions that will also be affected 
by them. 
 
B. Comprehensive Guidelines on IPR Licensing Agreements Needed 
 
Issuing guidelines on IPR licensing agreements is a common practice. 
But their coverage, degree of clarity and transparency vary across national 
borders; some of which begs improvement. Almost without exception, many 
documents have to be pieced together and constantly cross-referenced before 
a clear understanding of the law in certain jurisdictions can emerge. It is 
hoped that through studies like this paper national authorities can put 
forward comprehensive and complete guidelines on IPR licensing 
agreements. Such guidelines should not shy away from shedding light on 
widely used local licensing arrangements, which are crucial to the 
production, uptake and penetration of innovative products, services and 
competition in their respective markets. After all, the more economic 
approach does not mean universal uniformity, otherwise the per se rule 
would reign. 
 
C. The Effects that the More Economic Approach Should Pursue  
 
The more economic approach will inevitably require greater economic 
literacy from IPR specialists.109 We then need to enquire which kind of 
effects is relevant for the assessment of the pro and anti-competitiveness of a 
specific-IPR related conduct, whether it is the “effective competition 
structure” (the European Courts),110 “consumer harm” (U.S. courts and 
European Commission) or the “consumer choice” advocated by Josef 
Drexl.111 It is tentatively submitted that the “effective competition structure” 
approach can be taken as a starting point as it is the least invasive into IPR 
and minimizes the costs of regulation. Ultimately, it is the consumer welfare, 
either in form of increase in choices or reduction of harm, which will be the 
final gauge for balancing competition law and IPR.  
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劉 孔 中 
摘 要  
本文以美國、歐盟（兼及德國）、日本、韓國及臺灣法制為主，
比較研究各國日益以經濟取向看待智慧財產權與競爭法之法律實
務，並且歸納出其共同的特徵：認知智慧財產權法的經濟性、設置介
入干預的門檻（安全港）以及論理（合理）原則取代當然（合法／非
法）原則。本文接著研究上述法制之競爭法如何處遇在專利落實與新
技術開發運用上日趨重要的專利庫授權條款，並整理出其彼此間最 
大差異點之所在（僅美國沒有「具有市場支配地位之專利庫濫用其支
配地位」的問題），並探討應如何看待或調和此種差異。專利庫授權
條款一旦被認定違反競爭法，將對基於智慧財產權法的禁制令以及專
利授權約款之效力有何影響，是本文關心的第三個主題。本文在結論
部分提出三點值得進一步研究的議題：專利庫應對競爭法主管機關透
明、涵蓋全部智慧財產權的授權約款單一準則有其必要性，以及經濟
取向應該以何種效益為依歸。 
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